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1. Introduction 
A growing body of research on organizational routines shows that routines can be characterized by 
endogenous change (D'Adderio (2008); Feldman (2000); Feldman and Pentland (2003); Howard-
Grenville (2005); Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville (2011); Rerup and Feldman (2011)). Although 
actors are constrained by rules and their existing understandings of routines, this line of research 
acknowledges that actors still have significant degrees of freedom in how they interpret given situa-
tions and in how they perform routines in specific practice (Bruns (2009); Essén (2008); Feldman 
(2000)). Hence, situation-specific enactments of routines might result in deviations from formal 
rules (Bruns (2009); Desai (2010)), but also in the eventual readjustment of the actors’ understand-
ing of those routines (Feldman and Pentland (2003)). In this paper, we argue that to reveal or "un-
pack" the factors that influence the stability of organizational routine or changes to that routine, we 
must develop a deeper understanding of how actors justify changes in the performance of routines 
and deviations from formal rules. 
The notion of stability and change is a long-standing topic in research on organizational routines. 
Understanding the phenomena of stability and change in routines requires an in-depth investigation 
of the underlying mechanisms of the performance of those routines. The growing literature on or-
ganizational routines, which is based on behavioral perspectives and on theories of social practice, 
has contributed substantially to our understanding of these mechanisms. From a behavioral perspec-
tive, researchers characterize organizational routines as habitual responses to external stimuli (Ger-
sick and Hackman (1990)). Habitualized routines reduce the amount of cognitive energy that an 
individual requires to achieve certain objectives, because the individual does not have to think about 
alternatives (see also Ashforth and Fried (1988)). Hence, changes in organizational routines can be 
triggered just by “extraordinary events” (Gersick and Hackman (1990)). By drawing on theories of 
social practice (Bourdieu (1990); Giddens (1986)), recent research extends the view of routines as 
habits by stressing that routines are characterized by a dual ontology of "structure" and "agency" 
(Giddens (1986)). That is, routines change based on the selective retention of specific performances 
of those routines (Feldman (2000, 2003)), a process that highlights the fact that actors are not "cul-
tural dopes" (for this description, see Garfinkel (1967)). Instead, they possess significant reflexive 
capacities and degrees of freedom (Emirbayer and Mische (1998)) in how they perform routines in 
practice. However, as shown by recent empirical research, the performance of routines is always 
shaped by norms and values (Bruns (2009); Essén (2008)) that might be shared across industries or 
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societies (Stark (2009)). As yet, we have no in-depth understanding of how these institutional fac-
tors (Thornton and Ocasio (2008)) affect the performance of routines. However, we do know that 
the institutional environment provides interpretive schemata (Beamish and Biggart (2010)) that in-
fluence how actors evaluate situations and how they behave in organizational routines. 
In line with recent research on strategy as practice (Denis, Langley, and Rouleou 2007) and institu-
tional theory (Patriotta, Gond, and Schultz (2010)), we suggest that researchers can apply a conven-
tionalist perspective to formulate theories on the factors that may influence the performance of rou-
tines. Conventions are a means of enabling coordination in social situations. The notion of conven-
tions emphasizes social accountability as well as the justification of actions (Biggart and Beamish 
(2003)). Convention theory promises a more nuanced perspective on how actors try to justify their 
behavior as part of the performance of routines. Convention theorists argue that “…many situations 
in social life can be analyzed by their requirement for the justification of action” (Boltanski and 
Thévenot (1999,), our italics). In particular, analyzing the process of justification, i.e. when actors 
state reasons for their actions, improves our understanding of the origins of the behavioral manifes-
tations of the performance of routines. In this paper, we develop this idea in greater detail by draw-
ing on the publication, “On justification” (Boltanski and Thévenot (2006)) and the elaboration of 
the "Economy of Conventions" (Boltanski and Thévenot (1999, 2000), Biggart and Beamish 
(2003), Diaz-Bone (2011), Jagd (2004, 2007); Wagner (1994, 1999), Wilkinson (1997)). 
We make two contributions to the literature on stability and change in routines. First, we refine the 
notion of how people interact and justify the performance of routines, i.e., we define the interac-
tionalist dimension. Second, we integrate the institutional environment in terms of conventions into 
the conceptualization of organizational routines and discuss how actors refer to local and common 
forms of understanding when they are engaged in organizational routines. In addition to these theo-
retical contributions, we indicate ways in which the conventionalist perspective can be applied in 
empirical research. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we identify some of the limitations in the current 
conceptualizations of organizational routines. In section 3 we introduce the Economy of Conven-
tions as a promising theoretical approach to investigating this phenomenon. In section 4, building 
on convention theory, we illustrate what the conventionalist perspective on organizational routines 
can offer to the researcher in terms of improving our understanding of organizational routines. In 
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section 5, we indicate some of the methodological implications of adapting this conventionalist per-
spective to empirical research. In section 6 we present a brief conclusion. 
2. State of research and research gaps 
2.1 Structure and agency in current research on routines 
Traditionally, routines have been conceptualized as what Nelson and Winter (1982) call the “genes” 
or and Cohen and Bacdayan (1994) call the “memory” of organizations. These metaphorical terms 
emphasize the stable and persistent character of organizational routines. However, a growing body 
of more recent research on organizational routines shows that routines are not as rigid as previously 
assumed, but can change endogenously through the very performance of those routines (Feldman 
(2000); Feldman and Pentland (2003); D'Adderio (2009); Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville 
(2011)). This line of research acknowledges the social character of organizational routines and tries 
to understand the significance of the micro-level aspects of how routines are enacted in practice 
(Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville (2011)). For instance, Salvato (2009) focuses on ‘ordinary activ-
ities’ that build up organizational routines; Feldman and Rafaelo (2002) addresses the ‘connections 
between people’ that influence the common enactment and (re-)creation of organizational routines; 
van de Steen (2009) concentrates on behavioral scripts as “individual resources for routines”; and 
Rerup and Feldman (2011) unpack how trial and error-based learning facilitates the emergence of 
and change in routines. 
Moreover, research on organizational routines is increasingly focuses on how tools and artifacts and 
individual performances are mutually adapted (D’Adderio (2003, 2008); Orlikowski (2007); Pent-
land and Feldman (2005)). Technology in particular has been recognized as a special kind of artifact 
that has a major influence on organizational routines (e.g., Barley and Tolbert (1997); Edmonson, 
Bohmer, and Pisano (2001); Pentland (2007); Boudreau and Robey (2005); D'Adderio (2003), 
(2009)). For instance, Barley (1986) analyzes how the introduction of a new CT scanner in different 
hospitals first disrupts existing social structures and then, after a period of “re-structuring” between 
physicians, radiologists and nurses, leads to a new social order, different patterns of action, and dif-
ferent organizational routines. To give a further example, D’Adderio (2008) shows that standard 
operational procedures that are based on a software-based data and process management tool con-
strain individual actions, but coincidently have to be interpreted and incorporated into the perfor-
mance of specific routines with some degrees of freedom. Based on actor–network theory, re-
  3 
 
searchers argue that the human and non-human agencies that are embedded in technologies and 
objects are deeply rooted in the performance of routines (D’Adderio (2010)). 
On a theoretical level, the practice perspective on routines (Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville 
(2011)) imply a duality of structure and agency (Giddens (1986)). In this respect, research has dif-
ferentiated between ‘representation’ and ‘expressions’ (Cohen, Burkhart, Dosi, Egidi, Marengo, 
Warglien, and Winter (1996)) or between ‘ostensive’ and ‘performative’ aspects of routines (Feld-
man (2000); Feldman and Pentland (2003)). Feldman and Pentland's view has deeply influenced 
current thinking on organizational routines. Following Feldman and Pentland (2003), the ostensive 
aspect entails the abstract understandings of organizational members of their general idea is of an 
organizational routine. The ostensive understanding of the routine guides the members of an organi-
zation in their behavior; it helps them to identify specific routines and account for their individual 
activity within those routines. The ostensive aspect is always incomplete, in the sense that it lacks 
the very context that is necessary for the routine performance (Blau (1955); Hayek (1944); Reynaud 
(2005)). Thus, the ostensive aspect of a routine is not the embodiment of the routine itself. Empiri-
cal research shows that routines are always performed differently, based on the decisions of indi-
viduals and the constraints of the organizational environment (Essén (2008); Feldman and Pentland 
(2003); Howard-Grenville (2005)). It is the performative aspect that encompasses the specific ac-
tions taken by people engaged in organizational routines. Yet, the ostensive and the performative 
aspects of organizational routines are inextricably linked (Feldman (2000); Feldman and Pentland 
(2003)). On the one hand, the situated performances of a routine reinforce the ostensive aspect; on 
the other hand, ostensive understandings evolve over time through the selective retention of specific 
performances of that routine. This process of selective retention is highly political, because it may 
involve changes to formal rules and to how routines are performed in the future (Feldman and Pent-
land (2003)).  
2.2 Limitations of current notions of agency in organizational routines 
The research described above has substantially enhanced our understanding of routines as sources 
of both stability and change. However, in this paper, we address two shortcomings in the research 
on organizational routines. 
First, current theory on organizational routines ignores the way in which interactions among actors 
shape the performance of routines (similar to Felin and Foss (2009); Felin et al. (2012)); Hallett and 
Ventresca (2006)). The performance of routines in practice requires coordination, and this coordina-
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tion also entails an interactionalist dimension. By ‘interactionalist dimension’, we refer to the inter-
dependencies of actors when they are performing routines in practice. Actors must negotiate a 
shared understanding of the routine and justify their behavior, either by referring to the routine itself 
or other points of reference. This interactionalist dimension goes beyond merely adapting activities 
within the organizational routine, either through standardization or through forms of ad hoc coordi-
nation by informal communication (which Mintzberg (1980) calls "mutual adjustment".) But re-
searchers have not yet extensively discussed these micro-interactions between different actors en-
gaged in the performance of organizational routines. For instance, although Feldman (2000) high-
lights the role of shared understandings in performing organizational routines, she does not further 
elaborate this idea. Thus far, the interactionalist dimension of routines has been conceptualized as 
the “interdependence of actions [which] can set practical constraints on individuals that are unique 
to particular performances” (Feldman and Pentland (2003), see also Jarzabkowski, Le, and Feldman 
(2012)). Hence, we know only a little about the social interactions between actors, and—at least 
within the scope of this paper—little about the processes of negotiation and justification that lead to 
change or stability in the ostensive and performative aspects of routines (Feldman and Pentland 
(2003)). 
Second, current theories on organizational routines do not take into account how the institutional 
environment influences actors in performing their routines. There is only a limited discussion of this 
issue in the research thus far, for instance, in terms of the embeddedness of routines within other 
organizational structures, such as cultural expectations (Howard-Grenville (2005); see also Feldman 
(2003), who refers to Sewell’s (1992) concept of the ‘multiplicity of structures’). Strongly embed-
ded routines should be more stable than weakly coupled ones. However, these important insights 
are limited to research on organizational structures. Looking beyond this context, some researchers 
argue that the routine-specific structures of routines are further enmeshed in or informed by institu-
tional elements from the organizational environment (Greenwood (2008)). Current conceptualiza-
tions of agency (e.g., those based on Emirbayer and Mische (1998)) in the theories on organization-
al routines do not consider the wider institutional aspects such as societal logics that affect actors’ 
everyday actions and interactions (Friedland and Alford (1994); Thornton and Ocasio (2008)). 
Some of the aspects discussed above have been examined in research on organizational institution-
alism (Greenwood (2008)). This research aims at understanding how people in organizations deal 
with a multiplicity of different societal logics and how they shape the individual’s activities in spe-
cific situations (Zilber (2002); Reay and Hinings (2009)). For instance, Reay and Hinings (2009) 
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show that actors who are guided by different kinds of institutional logics such as a business-oriented 
logic or a healthcare-oriented logic in a hospital, can manage their competing sets of logics by es-
tablishing specific forms of collaborations (e.g., decision-making routines). Hence, changes in the 
institutional environment, such as when a new logic enters established fields, provoke changes in 
the organizational routines. 
Nonetheless, to our knowledge, these aspects have not been part of the theoretical discussion on 
organizational routines. However, trying to integrate the notion of societal logics, in which the fo-
cus is on rivalry, contradictions, and opposition, into the discussion on organizational routines 
would be like using a sledgehammer to crack a nut, considering the subtlety of the changes in rou-
tines that interest researchers. Hence, we introduce the Economy of Conventions into the discussion 
on organizational routines. 
 
3. Economy of Conventions 
3.1 Defining Convention: Conventions as a means of coordination 
In social situations actors must share and adjust their activities to achieve common objectives. Ac-
cording to the Economy of Conventions (EC), actors face uncertainty whenever they are engaged in 
situations that require coordination (Gomez and Jones (2000)). Yet, regardless of this uncertainty, 
people must take action (Jaeger (2001)). Actors need to agree on the situation and context in which 
activities are to take place (Eymard-Duvernay (2010)) and on which actions they deem are appro-
priate for accomplishing coordination. To evaluate the characteristics of a situation, actors draw up 
conventions (Eymard-Duvernay (2010); Eymard-Duvernay et al. (2005)). Biggart and Beamish 
(2003) define conventions as “…shared templates for interpreting situations and planning courses of 
action”. Conventions offer the possibility of coordination between individuals, and hence the pur-
suit of common intentions (Diaz-Bone and Thévenot (2010)). Conventions also “provide a basis for 
judging the appropriateness of acts by [the] self and others” (Biggart and Beamish (2003)), and thus 
provide a moral background for justifications and criticisms. 
A type of convention that is widely discussed in convention theory is the ‘quality convention.’ 
Quality conventions frame an individual’s expectations about the quality of products in terms, for 
instance, of visual appearance and taste. Convention theory assumes that there are pluralities of 
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(quality) conventions which are relevant in social situations. For example, in the market for French 
camembert cheese, convention theorists have identified two main quality conventions: a traditional-
ly produced, handmade delicacy and an industrially produced standardized product (Diaz-Bone 
(2009)). These two quality conventions frame the uncertainty of customer’s expectations about a 
product’s characteristics, such as taste, price, or social prestige. They also inform consumers' inter-
pretations of how to produce camembert (mass-produced or handmade), and influence the quality of 
the primary ingredients (homogenized milk or raw milk). 
Drawing on quality conventions allows for social coordination. For example, operational staff and 
managers in a camembert-producing firm apply conventional understandings of product quality 
when they discuss the introduction of new manufacturing technologies. A new technology would be 
valued differently according to whether the actors apply the traditional or the industrial quality con-
vention for camembert. In the traditional scenario, a technology that would merely support the 
handmade production process would be accepted, but not if it would diminish the handcrafted ele-
ment by standardizing the product quality. Hence, conventional notions of product quality are not 
limited to a customer’s perspective but instead influence organizations or entire industries (Mur-
doch, Marsden, and Banks (2000); Storper (1997)) or value chains (Ponte and Gibbon (2005)). 
Quality conventions establish coherence (e.g., of expectations) within firms and between different 
producers, suppliers and customers (Diaz-Bone (2007, 2009)). 
3.2 Justification and critical situations: unfolding conventions 
The convention-based evaluation of situations does not necessarily lead to immediate, or even tacit, 
mutual agreement between actors. More often than not, actors disagree. When coordination is not 
based on actors’ shared tacit understanding, actors need to coordinate themselves explicitly. Con-
vention theory refers to such situations of explicit coordination as ‘critical situations.’ In critical 
situations (also called critical moments, disputes, causes, or affairs (Wagner (1994)) actors must 
reveal the conventions that they use implicitly, and which are likely to justify their interpretations 
and actions explicitly to negotiate appropriate courses of action (Boltanski and Thévenot (2006)). 
For instance, a cheese dairy that relies mainly on the traditional handmade production of camembert 
can face a significant challenge if it is required to reduce costs, e.g., by introducing more efficient 
technologies. By deciding how to cope with this challenge, conventions, which have already been 
implicitly applied before the change was deemed necessary, serve as a focal point for explicit justi-
fications. If actors do not share an implicit understanding of where to draw the line between sup-
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porting handmade production and diminishing traditional product quality, this issue must be negoti-
ated explicitly. Actors then draw on conventions in negotiating this issue and justifying their eval-
uations of this change. 
When actors justify their evaluations (i.e., how they interpret a situation) and their actions, they 
refer to conventions. If actors ignore conventions, they “risk being unintelligible to others or judged 
immoral or irrational” (Biggart and Beamish (2003)). However, justifications are not limited to ret-
rospective rationalizations of either planned actions or those put into practice. Justification not only 
works ex post for what has already been done, but also, actors anticipate ex ante that they can be 
challenged to justify their actions and orient their behavior based on this potential need for justifica-
tion. According to the EC, “participants collectively address uncertainty by seeking both a priori 
and retrospective justifications for their actions” (Beamish and Biggart (2010).  
3.3 Orders of worth: The moral foundations of conventions 
Actors rely on conventions to justify their actions. However, within the same situation there can be 
several conventions on which actors rely (Boltanski and Thévenot (1999)). Hence, the expression of 
an explicit justification by one actor might compete with those of other actors who might rely on 
other conventions. Convention-based arguments are more persuasive when they are backed by 
widely accepted norms. The recourse to the normative elements (rationalities) of the environment 
can be a reliable source for reinforcing justifications with morality. The EC not only stresses that 
there is a plurality of conventions (such as quality conventions) that can be applied to the same situ-
ation, but also that there is a plurality of rationalities. Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) suggest a ty-
pology of competing rationalities: inspired, domestic, civic, opinion, market, and industrial. They 
call this framework of rationalities ‘orders of worth’ and the rationalities itself ‘worlds’.1 Each 
world has specific characteristics. The industrial world, for instance, is grounded in efficiency and 
productivity. The industrial world is very important in larger organizations, but also can be relevant 
in other social settings. By contrast, the domestic world is reserved for interpersonal relationships, 
in which trust, reliance, and honesty rather than strategic interests are relevant. Such relationships 
are not restricted to contexts of family and friends, but instead function in all situations in which 
individuals know each other personally (Boltanski and Thévenot (1999, 2006).  
1 Orders of worth have some similarities with institutional logics of Friedland and Alford (1994), or with value spheres 
of Max Weber (2007). For the difference, which cannot be elaborated here due to space limitations, we refer the read-
er to Cloutier and Langley (2007) and Daudigeos and Valiorgue (2010).  
  8 
 
                                                 
Orders of worth are the fundamental normative basis of conventions. Therefore, actors may draw on 
them as a last resort in their evaluative practices and justifications. Every situation is characterized 
by a complex interplay of a multitude of rationalities. Actors can negotiate compromises between 
different rationalities and then embed them in local forms of conventions. For instance, both the 
mechanized and the handmade forms of camembert production are based on the industrial world 
and the domestic world of justification: handmade production needs to be efficient, while industrial 
production must rely on interpersonal relationships and familiarity. However, the way in which 
these orders of worth (rationalities) are interwoven and integrated into the conventions of producing 
camembert differ substantially (Thévenot (2001)). Although in this exemplar both quality conven-
tions include elements from both the industrial and domestic worlds of justification, the industrial 
world is more prevalent in the industrial quality convention, and the domestic world of personalized 
firm–product–customer relationships is more dominant in the traditional quality convention (Diaz-
Bone (2009)). 
3.4 The role of critics in convention theory 
Critics often champion explicit justifications in critical situations (Messner, Clegg, and Kornberger 
(2008)). Criticism can either be reformist or radical (Bourguignon and Chiapello (2005)). On the 
one hand, actors can voice reformist critics; they can criticize a specific scenario without question-
ing the fundamental orders of worth (rationalities) on which the situation is based. A performance 
review, for instance, is widely seen as a good way of identifying the best candidates for promotion. 
Performance reviews follow an industrial world of justification, in which the efficiency and perfor-
mance of candidates are core values. An actor may complain that the organizational routines of a 
performance appraisal system (such as how the firm conducts performance appraisals) involves 
elements that are incompatible with the industrial world of justification that underlies the perfor-
mance review (Bourguignon and Chiapello (2005)). In an explicit example of a criticism, an actor 
might criticize an obviously biased opinion of an evaluator because the evaluator’s action does not 
fit the general idea of how a performance appraisal system should work. Reformist critics seek to 
improve the performance appraisal system by requiring that it follow the industrial world more 
strictly. For instance, a firm could try to strengthen its performance appraisal system by encourag-
ing changes in the regulations or by introducing training sessions for evaluators designed to prevent 
the future occurrence of biased opinions.  
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On the other hand, actors can voice their criticism more strongly by rejecting the the rationale that 
underlies a particular situation. Such an actor could argue that a performance appraisal based on an 
industrial world of justification should be abolished and that the distribution of social goods such as 
promotion, status, or income should be regulated by other social mechanisms. This type of actor 
would be classified as a radical critic (Boltanski and Thévenot (1999)). 
3.5 Conventions, social structure and institutions: some clarifications 
Using the EC as a lens requires some theoretical clarifications and its theoretical location. The EC is 
a micro-sociological approach that, like symbolic interactionism (Blumer (1969)), focuses on the 
interactions between individuals. However, due to the presence of orders of worth, the EC also has 
a macro-structural element. Yet, the EC is a “middle-range perspective [that] begins from micro 
foundations, not structural ones” (Biggart and Beamish (2003)). Orders of worth and conventions 
do not frame individual actions deterministically (Diaz-Bone and Thévenot (2010); Storper and 
Salais (1997)). Conventions can be tacit and taken for granted (Gomez and Jones (200)); convention 
theory explicitly stresses the critical and reflexive competencies of actors (Eymard-Duvernay 
(2002)). Actors are able to cope with many different orders of worth and numerous local conven-
tions, and they are also able to apply a plurality of conventions in specific cases (Guggenheim and 
Potthast (2012)). The notion that actors can reflect on and criticize conventions (Boltanski (2010)) 
offers the possibility that conventions can be used strategically for the purpose of persuasion. Yet, 
the extent to which a strategic use is possible depends on the actor’s abilities as well as on how 
powerful the conventions are. Lazega and Favereau (2002) describe conventions as follows: 
"Conventions are often agreements about how one should coordinate with others, but ground-
ed on interpretation as much as on calculation. But to the extent they are rules, they do not de-
termine behaviour mechanically because they have to be interpreted and applied. They are 
sometimes resources, sometimes constraints, depending on the situation and on where the in-
dividual is in the structure." 
----------------------- 
Insert figure 1 here 
----------------------- 
The EC distinguishes between conventions and institutions (Diaz-Bone (2011)). To understand this 
distinction requires a brief explanation of the relationship between them. By drawing on North’s 
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(1990) understanding of institutions as social rules and constraints, the EC stresses that institutions 
need to be interpreted and applied (Diaz-Bone (2011)). Conventions serve as interpretative schemes 
by which actors interpret institutions and suggest ways in which those schemes could be put into 
practice. The notion of conventions in the EC is similar to the notion of institutions proposed by 
Berger and Luckmann (1967), who also see institutions as embedded in social interaction. However, 
the notion of conventions looks beyond this perspective by stressing the critical and reflexive com-
petencies of actors, and by linking conventions more closely with daily activities. Further, the EC 
stresses that conventions have a moral aspect, because they can be used as a means of justifying 
actions (Boltanski and Thévenot (2006)). 
3.6 Conventions, technologies and artifacts 
The EC discusses role of artifacts such as technologies, objects, or social categories such as official 
classifications. Conventions are enmeshed with these material elements (Thévenot (1984)). Actors 
use artifacts to justify their actions and to substantiate their claims. They can, for instance, refer to 
the perceived or factual constraints that they believe result from technological procedures or they 
can refer to objects that support their justifications (Boltanski and Thévenot (1999)). Conventions as 
a means of justifying actions are then embedded in the real or material world and materiality serves 
as a pillar of conventions.  
To illustrate this argument, we again refer to the production of camembert. Consider a cheese 
dairy that produces camembert in the traditional way. The actors in this dairy discuss the possibility 
of introducing new technologies to improve efficiency. Based on the traditional quality convention, 
the managers and employees of this firm could refer to the limited ability of modern technology to 
produce the desired handmade quality that is inherent in their firm’s camembert. Thus, in addition 
to its production function, technology also serves as a material reference for valuing the specific 
competencies of the employees, who perform tasks that cannot be done by technologies and that 
require many years of experience.  
4. A conventionalist perspective on organizational routines 
4.1 Unpacking the interactionalist dimension of organizational routines 
The conventionalist perspective elaborated above enables to enrich our understanding of organiza-
tional routines. Figure 2 illustrates our arguments.  
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----------------------- 
Insert figure 2 here 
----------------------- 
Current research acknowledges that routines involve multiple actors (Cohen et al. (1996)) and that 
routines are characterized by an “interdependence of actions” (Feldman and Pentland (2003). Yet, 
research does not explain precisely how actors can actually adjust their actions with respect to those 
of other actors engaged in the same routine,or how they negotiate common understandings of their 
performance of those routines. Feldman (2000) notes that “…people, who engage in routines, adjust 
their actions as they develop new understandings of what they can do and of the consequences of 
their actions.” We agree that actors are likely to adjust their performance of routines to accommo-
date situation-specific constraints. However, one aspect is missing. Although most theoretical ac-
counts emphasize that routines are performed by multiple actors (Feldman and Pentland (2003); 
Nelson and Winter (1982)), the requisite interactions for coordination have largely been ignored 
(Felin et al. (2012)). The adoption of a conventionalist perspective can contribute to rectifying this 
shortcoming.  
In the EC, the actor's need to justify his or her actions is central. The conventionalist understanding 
of organizational routines shifts the focus to how actors negotiate the legitimacy of actions and the 
appropriateness of behavior (Boltanski (2010)). In such negotiations the actor draws on and/or con-
structs more or less local, as appropriate, forms of conventions (Wilkinson (1997)). By following 
this theoretical approach, we argue that the need for justification cannot be met by merely stating 
"We did it this way the last time." Instead, to achieve legitimacy actors who are performing routines 
can always be challenged to justify their actions. Such justified legitimacy is not primarily grounded 
in behaviors that are taken for granted (Suchman (1995)). Legitimacy is based in the abilities of 
people to justify their actions by rhetorical recourse (Suddaby and Greenwood (2005)). We argue 
that in performing organizational routines actors adjust their actions by implicitly or explicitly ei-
ther referring to or by negotiating common understandings and local agreements about appropriate 
behavior. 
To illustrate, we use the closing-up routine of a housing company analyzed by Feldman (2000, 
2003). When students leave their residence halls at the end of the academic year, the staff of the 
housing company must assess any damage done. Initially, the staff checked the damages after the 
students had left the halls, but changed to a more structured procedure of compiling a room invento-
ry at the beginning of the year and an on-site checking-out procedure at the end of the year. In the 
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new checking-out procedure, the staff and the students assess possible damage together. This new 
routine enables the staff to identify the students responsible for any damage and to charge the costs 
to those students’ accounts. In this example, the staff members’ experience of an inappropriate pro-
cess triggers a change in the routine. However, staff members base their changes not only on effi-
ciency arguments or learning processes that might lead to better mastery of the closing-up routine, 
but also on justification arguments such as “…learning how to take care of one’s room was part of 
the education” (Feldman (2000)). This justification is quite surprising, because a housing company 
could be considered as a service unit that merely provides accommodation, but one that has no edu-
cational function.  
The conventionalist perspective provides the opportunity to further disentangle the reasons behind 
the changes in the performance of this routine. Based on the EC, we can assume that staff members 
have negotiated this understanding of their company as an educational service, and have made it a 
shared convention for interpreting their daily business. After a local agreement has been established 
(in this case, that housing has an educational function), this shared understanding serves as way to 
evaluate situations that occur in their business and to justify changes. Such negotiated agreements 
are ongoing: they can change, but they can also become more stable and long-lasting. In the latter 
case, local forms of shared understandings emerge to become more or less local conventions 
(Boltanski (2010)). 
We emphasize that people engaged in the same organizational routine do not automatically negoti-
ate conventions within their organizational routines. We assume that the staff of the housing com-
pany established their educational understanding of their business independently from the housing 
routine. However, the housing routine is interwoven with the educational convention of the housing 
company: first, people engaged in the specific housing routine evaluate the situations and justify 
their actions as an educational convention. Second, the interactionalist adjustment of the actions by 
people directly engaged in the housing routine contributes to the refinement or adjustment of the 
educational convention. Hence, the relationship between organizational routines is a recursive one, 
similar to the relationship between the ostensive and performative aspects of routines (Feldman 
(2003)). 
However, actors engaged in organizational routines do not have to share the same convention. In-
deed, organizational routines, when viewed as recurrent patterns of action, do not depend on shared 
understandings but on performed actions. Interdependent, coordinated and recurrent patterns of ac-
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tion can occur without common forms of understanding. For instance, in an empirical investigation 
of an open source software development project, Westenholz (2010) demonstrates that volunteer 
and employed developers have different conventionalist understandings about what they are doing 
and how they are doing it. Some developers do not share customer-specific components of the soft-
ware because they believe that, although not regulated by treaties, these components are owned by 
those organizations that have paid for the development. Other developers do not share customer-
specific knowledge. Instead, they rely on the idea that only the main parts of the open source soft-
ware should be open to everyone and that customer-specific developments are of no interest to the 
wider open-source community. Nonetheless, the developers work together in a coordinated manner, 
sharing the same practice. This finding also applies to organizational routines; people can still work 
together even though they rely on different conventions. 
However, when actors draw on different conventions, the arrangements of working together are 
fragile and may involve sources of tension. Such tensions are not simply functional or dysfunction-
al. Competing conventions that are relevant within the same organizational routine can trigger inno-
vative ideas (Stark (2009)) and can bring about the readjustment of organizational routines. Hence, 
multiple conventions can be a source of beneficial change in organizational routines. However, they 
can also be a source of substantial conflict that can jeopardize organizational effectiveness. The 
conventionalist perspective on organizational routines takes into account the possibility that there 
are contradictory conventions and recognizes that the interaction between them may have either a 
positive or negative influence on the performance of routines. The existence of competing conven-
tions does pose a challenge to organizations seeking to implement change, because they need to 
undertake “…intense work at adaption aimed at managing the tensions between different coordina-
tion conventions” (Thévenot (2001)).  
4.2 Integrating institutional environments and organizational routines 
As mentioned above, actors engaged in organizational routines rely on shared interpretations that 
they believe are widely accepted in their social environment. However, research on organizational 
routines has not yet considered the influence of the institutional environment (see Figure 2). One 
possible way of dealing with this shortcoming might be by identifying insights from research on 
organizational institutionalism that could be integrated into a conceptualization of organizational 
routines. However, the neo-institutional discourse is based mainly on structural elements, especially 
societal logics. Although recent research on organizational institutionalism has intensified its focus 
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on the elaboration of a microperspective and stresses the role of individual agency (Powell and Col-
yvas (2008); Hallett (2010); Hallett and Ventresca (2006)), the neo-institutional discourse primarily 
identifies institutional change as a consequence of institutional contradictions (e.g., Seo and Creed 
(2002)) or sees organizational change as an effect of changing institutional logics (Meyer and 
Hammerschmid (2006)). Following these ideas, organizational theorists usually juxtapose different 
logics on which agents rely, or postulate the coexistence of different logics or temporal arrange-
ments over a certain period of time (Cloutier and Langley (2007); Reay and Hinings (2009); Town-
ley (2002)). 
However, research on organizational routines is interested in the process of change or the mainte-
nance of stability in organizational routines that occurs as a result of the ongoing flux in the perfor-
mance of routines. Therefore, the discussion on organizational routines should not focus on their 
“…predetermination by environmental conditions” (Lazaric (2000)) or on institutional contradic-
tions, but instead on embedded individuals who rely on (and are not predetermined to enact) socie-
tal elements. The conventionalist perspective outlined above offers the possibility of integrating 
institutional elements from the institutional environment. On a local level such as in a specialist 
organization or particular branch of industry, these institutional elements are conventions; on a 
higher level, they are rationales, both of which influence the performance of routines. 
Taking such an approach would contribute to our understanding of the difficulties encountered in 
the replication of routines (Winter and Szulanski (2001); Güttel et al. (2012)). Local conventions, 
which can extend beyond a single organization, can foster or hinder the transferability of organiza-
tional routines. To elaborate, we return to the closing-up routine of the housing company analyzed 
by Feldman (2000). The housing company changed their checking-out routine at student halls of 
residence from an unstructured to a more structured procedure. This change was based on an educa-
tional-quality convention, i.e., employees perceived that the housing company has an educational 
function. It follows that other housing companies might have other interpretations of their job. They 
might have a conventionalist understanding that is based on a professional service quality. Hence, 
transferring the new closing-up routine of the housing company analyzed by Feldman to other hous-
ing companies might not be successful. Based on arguments of efficiency, to reduce their checking-
out efforts, other housing company actors might argue in favor of a higher deposit or a higher rent 
to cover damages. Thus, both housing companies are able to justify their actions, albeit with refer-
ence to different conventions. 
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Just as local-level conventions may differ across organizations, higher-level conventions may also 
differ across countries. For instance, Lamont and Thévenot (2000) argue that conventions “…based 
on market performance are much more frequent in the United States” while conventions “…based 
on civic solidarity are more salient in France”. Such conventions can influence the way in which 
organizations conduct their business, as Weber (2000) shows in his examination of the book pub-
lishing market. Although the publishing markets in France and the United States have several com-
monalities such as differentiating between literary and commercial publishing, both markets differ 
on the embeddedness of history. French publishing houses evaluate manuscripts according to their 
fit with their country’s historical roots, but American publishers evaluate manuscripts with respect 
to their current cultural issues. American publishing houses hence are more in tune with the spirit of 
the age, while French ones are interesting in trying to preserve and carefully influence French cul-
tural identity (Weber (2000)). Hence, the successful transfer of organizational routines would have 
to be sensitive to institutional environments' culture-specific conventions that could foster or hinder 
the transferability of organizational routines (see also Kostava (1996)). 
5. Methodological implications 
We have presented some initial ideas on what researchers on organizational routines can learn by 
applying a conventionalist perspective. The potential of this theoretical perspective can be lever-
aged by applying it to empirical research. The EC “…exhibits methodological affinities with an 
intellectual tradition that privilege the micro-sociology of situated action as in social interactionism 
and ethnomethodology” (Reinecke (2010)). We suggest that the conventionalist perspective on rou-
tines should adopt this methodological perspective and integrate it into research on organizational 
routines. The empirical analysis of the role of conventions in stability and change in routines re-
quires the observation of what the EC calls critical moments (Boltanski (2010)). Critical incidents 
are regularly used as a means of focusing interviews on the relevant phenomenon (Easterby-Smith 
et al. (2008); Flanagan (1954)) and of structuring key events in process-oriented studies of organi-
zational change (Langley (1999)). However, rather than considering critical incidents on an organi-
zation level, a conventionalist perspective shifts the emphasis to a micro-level breakdown of the 
routines in actors’ everyday actions and interactions, which is a nuanced but important difference 
(see Figure 2). Critical moments occur when something unusual happens. In organizational rou-
tines, critical moments might arise through, a decline in organizational performance, the introduc-
tion of a new regulation, or the appearance a new powerful actor (e.g., a manager) who starts to 
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participate in the organizational routine. Such critical moments challenge people to justify what 
they are doing, and might require themto change their actual behavior.  
Thus, a conventionalist perspective on organizational routines requires a research strategy that does 
not perceive organizational routines as an outcome of interaction, but instead systematically inves-
tigates the individuals engaged in the production, reproduction, or transformation of organizational 
routines. The starting point for such an investigation needs to be the perspective of the people en-
gaged in organizational routines. This research strategy contrasts with the recent contention of Pent-
land, Haerem, and Dillision (2010), who argue that “…behavioral manifestations are the best for 
empirical research on routines” and that “…the best available data are the patterns of action we ob-
serve in the surface level.” Analyzing critical moments through interviews and field observation can 
offer interesting insights into organizational routines. Critical statements (Messner, Clegg, and 
Kornberger (2008)) and justifications might be used to reveal strategic interests, conscious delibera-
tions and inter-individual negotiations that together form the basis for the performance of routines. 
Further, the justifications of actors may also reveal the mechanisms that underlie the performance of 
routines. In their expression of justifications and critical statements, actors refer to frameworks they 
believe are widely accepted in their social environment. 
Bourguignon and Chiapello's (2005) analysis of a performance appraisal system, which we referred 
to earlier, is an example of a conventionalist approach. Bourguignon and Chiapello analyze the role 
of explicit criticisms in the evolution of a performance appraisal system over a period of ten years. 
They differentiate between the actors who are radical critics who generally question the underlying 
normative principle of performance appraisals and reformist critics who aim to improve the current 
system. Generally, while the radical critics question the legitimacy of the performance appraisal, the 
reformist critics offer explicit ways in which to enhance routine performances through more or less 
incremental improvements. However, Bourguignon and Chiapello find that both forms of critic 
trigger change in the organizational routines of the performance appraisal system. 
6. Conclusion 
The Economy of Conventions is a theoretical perspective that is receiving an increasing amount of 
attention in the field of organizational studies. In this paper, we show how the conventionalist per-
spective of the Economy of Conventions can contribute to our understanding of organizational rou-
tines. In Table 1 we show how the conventionalist perspective contributes to relevant discussions in 
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organizational routines, and how it relates to the practice perspective on organizational routines 
(Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville 2011). 
----------------------- 
Insert table 1 here 
----------------------- 
The Economy of Conventions stresses that actors orient their behavior in accordance with the po-
tential requirement to justify it. To be justified is important for actors to be accepted as rational ac-
tors by others. When established conventions are part of the institutional environment of the actors 
concerned, these conventions can be used as references for justifications. In organizational routines, 
actors use conventions to evaluate situations and to negotiate common understandings of how to 
perform routines. The conventional perspective contributes to actors' desire to behave in a justifia-
ble manner within organizational routines. Hence, conventions influence the performance of rou-
tines such that either the routine changes or the routine remains stable. As our main contribution, we 
argue that a conventionalist perspective on organizational routines allows for the integration of in-
stitutional and interactionalist elements into our theoretical understanding of organizational rou-
tines. 
We note that our paper has some limitations. First, in concentrating our argument for the adoption 
of a conventionalist approach through the theoretical lens of the Economy of Conventions, we do 
not fully investigate other theories that might present similar arguments, such as those presented by 
Luhmann (1996) or March and Simon (1958). To achieve fuller leverage of the potential contribu-
tions of the Economy of Conventions there is a need for a more boundary-spanning analysis that 
considers different theoretical perspectives. Second, questions remain on how the conventionalist 
perspective relates to other different concepts of organizational routines. We mainly refer to the 
widely used definition we find in Feldman (2000) and Feldman and Pentland (2003). Therefore, we 
may have neglected other useful approaches. Our research focuses on how conventions influence 
the performance of routines. However, the relationship between conventions and routines is not 
unidirectional. Not only do conventions influence the performance of routines, the performance of 
routines can also change conventions. However, an analysis of this bidirectional relationship is be-
yond the scope of this paper. Tackling such questions would contribute to fully capturing the poten-
tial contributions of the Economy of Conventions.  
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Despite the limitations of our paper, we demonstrate that a conventionalist perspective on organiza-
tional routines can offer interesting insights that can serve as a good starting point for further re-
search and practical advice. For instance, we show that the institutional context matters. Therefore, 
when organizations aim to replicate organizational routines, managers should acknowledge the in-
fluence of conventions, especially when they wish to replicate routines across cultural boundaries. 
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Table 1: Contributions of the conventionalist perspective on routines 
Relevant discussions in  
organizational routines
Main assumptions of the 
practice perspective on 
organizational routines
Contributions of the conventionalist 
perspective on routines
Agency
• Actors have freedom on how to 
perform routines
• Actors can adapt routines to new 
situational requirements or can 
follow their interests and motives
• Recursive, projective, present 
(improvisational) component of 
agency
• Focus on how actors draw on 
conventions
• Justification of actors and actions
• Recursive aspect of conventions through 
ex post justifications and ex ante 
orientation of potential justifications
• Focus on how actors negotiate shared 
understandings
Change and stability Endogenous change through actors  performances 
Conventions influence performances and 
are a source of change and stability
Objects Objects (artifacts) influence routine performance
Actors draw on objects when they 
negotiate routine performances
Main anchor for 
empirical research Behavioral patterns Critical situations
Key references Feldman (2000); Feldman and Pentland(2003); Howard-Grenville (2005)
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